Gaza/Tel Aviv – After a week of relentless Israeli air raids on the Gaza Strip, Israeli ground troops along the Gaza border are readying for an order for an incursion.

Since Israel launched its offensive shortly after 11 am (0900 GMT) last Saturday, its air force has destroyed more than 700 targets, a military spokeswoman in Tel Aviv said Friday.

At least 100 smuggling tunnels under the border with Egypt, as well as police stations, offices, houses, vehicles and rocket launching-, storing- and production sites belonging to the radical Islamic Hamas movement and its activists, were hit, many more than once.

After one week, the Israel Air Force’s “pool of targets are close to exhaustion,” one Israeli government official said.

Israel says its airstrikes have already dealt a “very tough blow” to Hamas’ weapons supply lines – the tunnels – and to its rocket production abilities and arsenal.

More than than 430 Palestinians have died. Many of them were members of Hamas’ armed wing and security forces. According to the United Nations, however, at least one quarter were civilians, who lived, stood or passed close by the buildings hit in the densely- populated coastal enclave.

Four Israelis were also killed by Palestinian rockets.

Despite the already surging toll in lives and infrastructure, according to Israel’s Channel 10 a majority of Israeli political and military leaders believe that without a ground operation, Israel cannot achieve the goal of Operation “Cast Lead” of significantly weakening both the ability and “motivation” of Hamas to fire rockets.

Israel wants to keep up the pressure on Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, until a “new security reality” is created in its southern regions, which have absorbed near-daily mortar and rocket attacks from Gaza over the past seven years.

It wants to achieve this either militarily, or by diplomatic solutions – the latter being more favourable to it than Hamas because militarily Israel is “winning” the battle – or most likely by both.

In that regard, Israel is building on lessons learnt from the 2006 Lebanon war, when it was in a relatively weak position as it negotiated UN Resolution 1701, which ended the
33 days of fighting with the radial Shiite Hezbollah movement. During that crisis, ground troops, which entered only at a late stage, were unable to advance very far into Lebanon and suffered heavy casualties when repelled by Hezbollah fighters.

Hamas has also drawn lessons from that war and is using Hezbollah as an example. Its defiant leaders have repeatedly stated that Israel can expect “a second Winograd.” Israel’s Winograd Commission harshly criticized the Olmert government’s handling of the inconclusive war – not least because the Israeli premier failed to define clear and realistic goals of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah and because ground troops were prepared only at a very late stage.

Since its take-over of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas has gradually transformed it’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, into a well-disciplined and well-trained semi-official army, with an estimated 16,500 fighters.

The Brigades have trained systematically for the scenario of a major Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. Hamas has admitted that it has periodically been sending groups of fighters to Iran, where several hundred have already completed intensive training at a closed military Revolutionary Guard base in Tehran.

Those who excelled returned to Gaza as instructors and trained thousands more in urban fighting, sniping and making explosives from households goods. Hundreds more Hamas fighters have trained in Syria under instructors who learnt their techniques in Iran.

While a host of Israeli analysts are convinced Hamas is scared to death of a ground offensive and has tried to avert it by making statements that it wants a new truce, Gaza residents say the opposite is true.

The air raids gave its fighters no option but to hide and face accusations of cowardice, and residents say Hamas is now eagerly awaiting the ground offensive – a chance to demonstrate its abilities and inflict a heavy toll on the Israeli ground troops.

Hamas fighters are said have set up booby traps and mines along routes Israeli soldiers are likely to take, and as in past incursions can be expected to confront the soldiers with explosives, rocket- propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles and mortar shells.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas is eager to declare victory and earn the respect of the street throughout the Arab world.

There is one important difference. While Hezbollah fighters could hide in the forests and hills of southern Lebanon, as well as flee and get new supplies deep inland, the flat Gaza Strip is only 45 kilometres long and on average some six kilometres wide: One can drive from the south to the north in 30 minutes – and jog from the east to the Mediterranean in 30 minutes. With the tunnels bombarded, there is no escaping from the tightly-sealed enclave.

Israel, which unlike Hamas has tanks and Apache helicopter gunships providing cover during ground fighting, wants to create a strong “deterrence” against the rocket fire by demonstrating its military superiority and by inflicting a “heavy price” on Hamas as well. If the Palestinian death toll is already the highest in four decades of the conflict, it can be expected to rise even further. (dpa)

Gaza/Tel Aviv – After a week of relentless Israeli air raids on the Gaza Strip, Israeli ground troops along the Gaza border are readying for an order for an incursion.

Since Israel launched its offensive shortly after 11 am (0900 GMT) last Saturday, its air force has destroyed more than 700 targets, a military spokeswoman in Tel Aviv said Friday.

At least 100 smuggling tunnels under the border with Egypt, as well as police stations, offices, houses, vehicles and rocket launching-, storing- and production sites belonging to the radical Islamic Hamas movement and its activists, were hit, many more than once.

After one week, the Israel Air Force’s “pool of targets are close to exhaustion,” one Israeli government official said.

Israel says its airstrikes have already dealt a “very tough blow” to Hamas’ weapons supply lines – the tunnels – and to its rocket production abilities and arsenal.

More than than 430 Palestinians have died. Many of them were members of Hamas’ armed wing and security forces. According to the United Nations, however, at least one quarter were civilians, who lived, stood or passed close by the buildings hit in the densely- populated coastal enclave.

Four Israelis were also killed by Palestinian rockets.

Despite the already surging toll in lives and infrastructure, according to Israel’s Channel 10 a majority of Israeli political and military leaders believe that without a ground operation, Israel cannot achieve the goal of Operation “Cast Lead” of significantly weakening both the ability and “motivation” of Hamas to fire rockets.

Israel wants to keep up the pressure on Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, until a “new security reality” is created in its southern regions, which have absorbed near-daily mortar and rocket attacks from Gaza over the past seven years.

It wants to achieve this either militarily, or by diplomatic solutions – the latter being more favourable to it than Hamas because militarily Israel is “winning” the battle – or most likely by both.

In that regard, Israel is building on lessons learnt from the 2006 Lebanon war, when it was in a relatively weak position as it negotiated UN Resolution 1701, which ended the
33 days of fighting with the radial Shiite Hezbollah movement. During that crisis, ground troops, which entered only at a late stage, were unable to advance very far into Lebanon and suffered heavy casualties when repelled by Hezbollah fighters.

Hamas has also drawn lessons from that war and is using Hezbollah as an example. Its defiant leaders have repeatedly stated that Israel can expect “a second Winograd.” Israel’s Winograd Commission harshly criticized the Olmert government’s handling of the inconclusive war – not least because the Israeli premier failed to define clear and realistic goals of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah and because ground troops were prepared only at a very late stage.

Since its take-over of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas has gradually transformed it’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, into a well-disciplined and well-trained semi-official army, with an estimated 16,500 fighters.

The Brigades have trained systematically for the scenario of a major Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. Hamas has admitted that it has periodically been sending groups of fighters to Iran, where several hundred have already completed intensive training at a closed military Revolutionary Guard base in Tehran.

Those who excelled returned to Gaza as instructors and trained thousands more in urban fighting, sniping and making explosives from households goods. Hundreds more Hamas fighters have trained in Syria under instructors who learnt their techniques in Iran.

While a host of Israeli analysts are convinced Hamas is scared to death of a ground offensive and has tried to avert it by making statements that it wants a new truce, Gaza residents say the opposite is true.

The air raids gave its fighters no option but to hide and face accusations of cowardice, and residents say Hamas is now eagerly awaiting the ground offensive – a chance to demonstrate its abilities and inflict a heavy toll on the Israeli ground troops.

Hamas fighters are said have set up booby traps and mines along routes Israeli soldiers are likely to take, and as in past incursions can be expected to confront the soldiers with explosives, rocket- propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles and mortar shells.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas is eager to declare victory and earn the respect of the street throughout the Arab world.

There is one important difference. While Hezbollah fighters could hide in the forests and hills of southern Lebanon, as well as flee and get new supplies deep inland, the flat Gaza Strip is only 45 kilometres long and on average some six kilometres wide: One can drive from the south to the north in 30 minutes – and jog from the east to the Mediterranean in 30 minutes. With the tunnels bombarded, there is no escaping from the tightly-sealed enclave.

Israel, which unlike Hamas has tanks and Apache helicopter gunships providing cover during ground fighting, wants to create a strong “deterrence” against the rocket fire by demonstrating its military superiority and by inflicting a “heavy price” on Hamas as well. If the Palestinian death toll is already the highest in four decades of the conflict, it can be expected to rise even further. (dpa)